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Abstract 
We argue that philosophical and historical research can constitute a ‘Biohumanities’ 
which deepens our understanding of biology itself; engages in constructive 'science 
criticism'; helps formulate new 'visions of biology'; and facilitates 'critical science 
communication'. We illustrate these ideas with two recent 'experimental philosophy' 
studies of the concept of the gene and of the concept of innateness conducted by ourselves 
and collaborators.  
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1. Introduction: What is 'Biohumanities'? 
Biohumanities is a view of the relationship between the humanities (especially 
philosophy and history of science), biology, and society1. In this vision, the humanities 
not only comment on the significance or implications of biological knowledge, but add to 
our understanding of biology itself. The history of genetics and philosophical work on the 
concept of the gene both enrich our understanding of genetics. This is perhaps most 
evident in classic works on the history of genetics, which not only describe how we 
reached our current theories but deepen our understanding of those theories through 
comparing and contrasting them to the alternatives which they displaced (Olby, 1974, 
1985). But philosophy of science also makes claims about genetics itself in, for example, 
discussions of whether the Mendelian gene and the molecular gene are the same entity 
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2006, 2007; Kitcher, 1984; Waters, 1994). 
 
The biohumanities label suggests a more intimate relationship between biology and the 
humanities than is suggested by labels such as 'biology and society' or 'ethical, legal and 
social implications' (ELSI). We should emphasize that we are primarily concerned with 
differences in the connotations of these labels, rather than differences in the actual work 
carried on under the labels. Much of the work conducted under 'biology and society' or 
'genomics and society' is closer to biohumanities as we describe it below than to anything 
suggested by those labels. The ELSI label has a particularly strong connotation that 
biologists provide the facts while humanists and social scientists are confined to 
discussing the implications of those facts. In contrast, biohumanities research aims to 
                                                
1 The term 'biohumanities' was first used as the title of research grant held by Griffiths, see 
http://paul.representinggenes.org/biohum_home.html.  
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feed back into our understanding of biology itself. Moreover, in the biohumanities vision, 
while history and philosophy of biology may provide resources for addressing ‘ELSI’ 
issues, that is not their primary aim. 
 
We see four major aims for research in the Biohumanities: understanding biology, 
constructive science criticism, contributing to new visions of biology, and contributing to 
critical science communication. First, and most generally, biohumanities is concerned 
with understanding biology. Although the biohumanities are of potential value to both 
biology and society, this is not the sole or main justification for engaging in this research. 
Science is fascinating and important, and it is worth understanding science even if 
understanding it does not have an immediate practical payoff, just as evolution is worth 
understanding whether or not doing so contributes to crop improvement or drug 
development. As in the biosciences themselves, it is hard to imagine Biohumanities 
researchers doing their best work without an intrinsic interest in the material they study. 
 
Second, biohumanities understands itself as a critical enterprise. Constructive 'science 
criticism' (Pigliucci and Kaplan, 2006, 8) stands back from the urgencies of actual 
research to reflect on  the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches. Thus, as C. 
Kenneth Waters has remarked, the aims of philosophical analysis include “to articulate 
scientific concepts in ways that help reveal epistemic virtues and limitations of particular 
sciences. This means an analysis of the gene concept(s) should help clarify the 
explanatory power and limitations of gene-based explanations, and should help account 
for the investigative utility and biases of gene-centered sciences” (Waters, 2004, 29).  
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Science criticism can also involve the “turning-over of stones that had hitherto held their 
ground” (Moss, 2006, 523). History of science points out the 'roads not taken' in science. 
Without calling into question the data that was gathered, it points out that other sorts of 
data might have been gathered, or that the data that was actually gathered could have 
been interpreted in different ways. Philosophy of science adds to this enterprise by 
critically analyzing the chains of reasoning that connect specific scientific findings to 
claims about the broader significance of those findings. This can lead to changes in 
interpretation that can potentially motivate biologists to reinterpret earlier scientific 
findings and to prioritize different questions for future research. Thus, ideally, critical 
history and philosophy of biology can contribute to our third goal, the articulation of 
alternative 'visions' of biology. 
 
Finally, history and philosophy of biology can contribute to the creation of 'critical 
science communication' both through constructive science criticism in the sense just 
outlined, and by communicating to a wider audience not merely 'what has been 
discovered', but something of the complexity of the scientific process and the 
contestability of its findings. To be valuable, critical work of the sort described in the last 
two paragraphs must be 'bioliterate', engaging with the science at the same level as 
practitioners rather than via popular representations. But the broad 'visions' of science in 
which it results can be expressed in a non-technical way, and can thus make a major 
contribution to the public understanding of science.  
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The remaining sections of the paper will give more substance to these remarks with two 
specific examples of research in which we have participated: the Representing Genes 
project and the Innateness study. Section two uses these project to highlight the new field 
of experimental philosophy of science, to introduce the ideas of scientific concepts as 
'tools' for research and the experimental philosopher of science as a 'conceptual 
ecologist'. Section three provides an example of how constructive criticism of research in 
molecular and developmental biology can lead to the formulation of a new vision of 
'postgenomic biology'. In section four we examine biohumanities in the role of a critical 
communicator of scientific results and scientific practice to wider audiences. We hope 
that these examples all point towards a new and fruitful relationship between the 
humanities, biology and society. 
 
2. Experimental Philosophy of Biology as Conceptual Ecology 
The new field of ‘experimental philosophy’ (X-phi) brings empirical work to bear on 
philosophical questions (Stotz, 2008). We have been involved in two X-phi projects. The 
first focused on changing concepts of the gene. Previous research has established that it is 
possible to operationalize questions about the gene concept in a survey instrument and 
examine the prevalence of particular gene concepts in different biological fields (Stotz et 
al., 2004). The Representing Genes Project was an extension of that earlier work (Stotz 
and Griffiths, 2004). The next section briefly describes the Representing Genes project, 
concentrating on the methods used. For our more substantive discussion of our findings 
about the gene concept, see (Griffiths and Stotz, 2006, 2007; Stotz, 2008). 
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The second X-phi study focused on the much-disputed concept of innateness. Griffiths, 
Machery and Linquist examined which features of behavior lead biologically naïve 
individuals to label behaviors 'innate' (Griffiths et al., Submitted). They used their 
findings to explain the persistent controversies over the definition of innateness. We 
outline this work in Section 2.2. 
 
2.1 The Representing Genes Project 
This project2 was an attempt to assess the impact of the on-going genomics revolution on 
concepts of the gene (Stotz et al., 2006; Stotz and Griffiths, 2004). The actual practice of 
genome annotation inspired us to design a simple, annotation-like task for part one of our 
survey instrument. This was used to investigate the criteria that lead biologists to annotate 
a particular DNA sequence as either one gene with several gene products or several genes 
with a single functional product. We used graphical representations and descriptions of 
real DNA transcription events in eukaryotic genomes to illustrate the features of genome 
expression that make it difficult to define a gene in a way that covers all known cases. 
Since common definitions of the gene are insufficient, the simplified annotation task is 
designed to reveal the additional implicit criteria which biologists draw upon when 
applying the term 'gene'.  
 
Another part of the survey instrument set out to investigate whether, as Lenny Moss has 
argued, investigators either start with the conception of a gene defined by its predictive 
relationship to a particular phenotype (Gene P), or with the conception of a concrete gene 
                                                
2 http://representinggenes.org 
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with a specific molecular sequence and the template capacity to code for many different 
products, depending on how it is transcribed and how its initial product is later processed 
(Gene D) (Moss, 2003). We argued that these different starting points would affect how 
investigators set out to unravel the complex relationship between genes and other 
molecular factors with the phenotype. Hence the second task asked subjects to assess the 
value of different research strategies for investigating complex diseases. For each disease 
we offered four strategies, designed to run along a continuum from focusing on the 
statistical relationship between gene and phene to entirely giving up on such a 
relationship in favor of analyzing content-dependent causal pathways between the two. 
We looked for differences in which strategies were favored by biologists from different 
backgrounds, and also at whether the choice of strategies changed between human versus 
animal disease, and for physiological versus psychological disease. 
 
2.2 The Innateness Study 
It is a truism that the term 'innate' is vague and ambiguous. Gianmatteo Mameli and 
Patrick Bateson have recently reviewed the scientific use of the term 'innate' and 
identified no less than twenty-six proposed definitions of the term, of which they judge 
eight to be both genuinely independent definitions and potentially valuable scientific 
constructs (Mameli and Bateson, 2006). However, the term 'innate' remains immensely 
popular in psychology and cognitive science. Some philosophers have proposed that in 
these contexts the term means little more than 'not my department – ask a biologist' 
(Samuels, 2002). But other philosophers of science continue to propose 'analyses' of the 
concept of innateness, designed to show that there is a single, coherent notion of 
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innateness that either does or should underlie the use of the term in the sciences of the 
mind. These analyses are typically subject to intuitively compelling counterexamples 
from the proponents of alternative analyses.  
 
The aim of this study was to provide some solid evidence about the pre-scientific or 
'vernacular' understanding of innateness (Griffiths et al., Submitted). To determine the 
factors affecting judgments of innateness the authors examined the responses of 
biologically naïve subjects to a series of examples of the development of birdsong. 
Birdsong was used because it offered the best chance of finding closely comparable 
behaviors exhibiting every combination of the factors which earlier work had suggested 
would be relevant to judgments of innateness (Griffiths 2002).  
 
The results provided clear evidence that when people decide whether a trait is innate, 
they focus on two independent cues—whether the trait is universal and whether its 
development is sensitive to environmental influences, and tentative evidence that people 
may use a third independent cue, namely whether a trait has a designed purpose. In the 
light of this the authors argued that current definitions of innateness have each identified 
it with one of the cues, ignoring the other cues. This explains why intuitively compelling 
counterexamples to each definition can so easily be found, simply by choosing examples 
that make the other cue(s) salient. 
 
2.3. The Philosopher as Ecologist 
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One motivation for the two empirical studies just described was to transcend the 
limitations of traditional conceptual analysis. The traditional method of devising a series 
of ingenious thought experiments too often ends with the 'dull thud of conflicting 
intuitions'. Experimental philosophy has the capacity to assess competing analyses 
against data and to avoid biases introduced by working with a single subdiscipline or a 
single school of thought in the science to be studied. 
 
Such philosophy ‘in the trenches’ is in a privileged position to provide the bridge 
between philosophy and science, since its aim to provide biological knowledge unites it 
with the science itself. At least part of philosophy of science has abandoned the idea that 
its job is to enforce rigor and precision within science through the stablization and 
disambiguation of scientific meanings. Equally gone is Paul Feyerabend’s conceptual 
anarchism, in which the history of science is little more than a series of changes in the 
fashionable topics of scientific discussion (Feyerabend, 1975). In place of these two 
models we have come to appreciate that conceptual change in science is rationally 
motivated by what scientists are trying to achieve, by their accumulated experience of 
how to achieve it, and by changes in what they are trying to achieve. Empirical science is 
a powerhouse of conceptual innovation. The gene concept is a case in point: in its century 
of existence the gene has been redefined many times, often radically. This makes sense if 
we think of concepts as tool of research, as ways of classifying the experience shaped by 
experimentalists to meet their specific needs. Necessarily these tools get reshaped as the 
demands of scientific work change. In the study of conceptual evolution, the history of 
genetics provides a ‘conceptual phylogeny’ of the gene. The Representing Genes project, 
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as an example of ‘conceptual ecology, can be seen as an attempt to determine some of the 
'ecological' pressures that caused the gene concept to diversify into a number of different 
'epistemic niches'. 
 
In this section we have given a brief description of some experimental philosophy of 
biology. We hope that these concrete examples give some substance to our claim that the 
humanities need not be confined to discussing the social or ethical consequences of 
biology, but can also contribute to a better understanding of biology itself, to 
understanding, for example, what genes are and what it is for something to be innate. 
 
3. From Science Criticism to a New Vision of Postgenomic Biology 
Biohumanities understands itself as a critical enterprise that reflects on the epistemic 
virtues and limitations of current approaches. An analysis of the gene concept should aim 
to shed light on the investigative utility and biases of gene-centered explanations in 
molecular, developmental and evolutionary biology. 
 
As a result of the Representing Genes project we have come to embrace a version of the 
widely accepted dichotomy between an abstract, statistical gene and a concrete, 
mechanistic gene (Falk, 2000; Gilbert, 2000; Gilbert, 2003; Moss, 2003), but have felt the 
need to introduce a further distinction between a simple ‘consensus gene’, based on 
prototypical examples of how genome structure supports genome function, and a 
‘postgenomic gene’ that embraces the messy reality of the wide range of known 
relationships between genome and genome product (Griffiths and Stotz, 2006). We 
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believe that the nature of the postgenomic gene supports the view that phenotypes are not 
simply expressions of genetic information but rather emerge from a 'developmental 
system' that encompasses many aspects of what would traditionally be regarded as the 
environment, 
 
Contemporary gene-centered accounts in molecular and developmental biology rest on a 
static, structural conception of the gene that clings as closely as the facts will allow to its 
starting point in the long-superceded idea of one gene: one polypeptide. In its place one 
of us has promoted the idea of 'constitutive molecular epigenesis’. It proposes to replace 
the metaphor of ‘gene action’ with the more apt metaphors of sequence ‘activation’, 
sequence ‘selection’ and sequence ‘creation’. These more accurately reflect what happens 
during the expression of the genome through transcriptional, co-transcriptional, and post-
transcriptional processes of DNA coding sequences (Stotz, 2006, 2007). Genes are 
'composed' on the fly by recombining in time and tissue-specific ways the template 
capacity of the genome.  
 
Postgenomic biology has brought with it a new conception of the ‘reactive genome’ that 
is not only activated and regulated, but in which sequence is actively selected and newly 
created during the expression process that include signals from the internal and external 
environment. Therefore alleged explanatory categories such as ‘genetic’ versus 
‘environmental’, instead of explaining the origin of a phenotype, rather preclude further 
investigation into its real causes.  
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The concept of a 'genetic trait', and the related idea of innateness, are often defended by 
pointing to the allegedly unique role of DNA in heredity. Transgenerational stability of 
form, however, requires more than faithful transmission of DNA. Genome sequences 
depend on the context for their differential expression.  Natural selection selects for 
adaptive phenotypes, which are always derived from non-linear interactions among a 
range of diverse developmental resources. Their organization frequently exhibits 
phenotypic plasticity, a capacity that allows the organism to react adaptively to different 
environmental conditions (Pigliucci, 2001; West-Eberhard, 2003). The stable but 
sufficiently plastic inheritance of an adaptive developmental system results from the 
reliable transmission of all the necessary developmental factors across generations. In 
other words, heredity relies on a stable ‘developmental niche’ which is faithfully 
reconstructed by various combinations of the population, the parent and the organism 
itself. The unit of evolution is the whole developmental system.  
 
To understand heredity and development we should  “Ask not what’s inside the genes 
you inherited, but what your genes are inside of” (West and King, 1987, 552). What 
counts is not so much the particular gene you inherit but when, where and how it is 
expressed by a time- and tissue dependent regulatory network. Given the ‘vulnerability’ 
of the genome to environmental influences it was simply a matter of time before most 
systems found ways to manage aspects of their developmental niche. Cytoplasmic 
chemical gradients, mRNAs, transcription factors together with the necessary cellular 
organelles and structures that are inherited with the ovum give this process a head start, 
and maternal control over the fetus’ environment extend to the uterus or pre-hatchling 
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state. Postnatal factors, such as the licking of pups by rat mothers, continue to influence 
gene expression levels. The protein packaging of DNA provides an imprinting system, 
often called the histone or chromatin code, which gives parents pre- and postnatal control 
over the offspring’s gene expression (Meaney, 2004). Parental effects also include 
differential provisioning of resources, preference induction (oviposition, imprinting on 
food, habitat, and mates), and social learning (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Mousseau and 
Fox, 2003).  
 
There have been repeated attempts to reduce all of these mechanisms of extended 
inheritance to the action of inherited or parent-of-origin genes, so that ultimately the real 
causes are all genetic. This special pleading fails in the light of the discovery that 
development relies less on the presence of particular genes in an organism than on the 
regulated expression of genomes, which ultimately depends on environmental, as well as 
genomic, factors. Wherever there are genes there are extragenetic factors necessary for 
their regulated expression.  
 
This story shows how science criticism can lead to changes in interpretation of known 
facts to give rise to a different – in this case radically different – vision of biology. One 
aim of constructing such a new vision is to potentially motivate biologists to reinterpret 
earlier scientific findings and to prioritize different questions for future research. 
Another, as we now go on to discuss, is to contribute to a more adequate form of science 
communication. 
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4. Biohumanities and Critical Science Communication 
If the history and philosophy of biology has something to offer to the public 
understanding of science, it is to contribute to the creation of a critical science 
communication process, one aimed at making expert understanding accessible whilst 
simultaneously revealing it as contestable. Historians of science have often tried to 
achieve this by emphasizing the contingency of the intellectual frameworks within which 
science accommodates data and which in turn influence the kinds of data that are 
collected. By documenting the historical influences that led scientists to adopt a particular 
intellectual framework they suggest that different choices might have led science to 
develop in a different manner. Discussions of the origin of the informational framework 
for understanding genetics make a case for historical contingency of this kind (Kay, 
2000; Keller, 1995). This is not to suggest that the currently dominant intellectual 
framework does not accommodate the data that has been gathered, or even that it was not 
(or is not) a fruitful source of discoveries. The point is rather that there are other ways to 
look at that data, and that there are other kinds of data that might be gathered.  
 
Philosophers of science have been less concerned than historians with the contestability 
of science. Their main contribution to science criticism has been to analyze the chains of 
reasoning that connect specific scientific findings to claims about the broad significance 
of those findings. There is very direct connection between this work and the public 
understanding of science, since it is just these broader claims about the wider significance 
of some class of scientific findings that tend to be the focus of popular science writing. 
Thus, for example, following the publication of The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976) and 
related works, philosophers of science discussed whether developments in evolutionary 
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genetics in the 1960s and 1970s really implied that the individual gene is the unit of 
evolutionary change. Some argued that this model of the evolutionary process was simply 
equivalent to more traditional models. Other argued that there were substantial scientific 
reasons to prefer more traditional models in at least some cases. Rather than being 
straightforward empirical matters, these questions were shown to turn on philosophical 
issues such as the nature of theory reduction, or the relationship between prediction and 
explanation (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999, Chapters 3-4). The work of a number of 
philosophers and biologists gradually established that the most socially prominent claim 
made on the basis of mid-twentieth century genetics – that the fundamental principle of 
evolution is individual selfishness – is at least as much a matter of semantics as a 
'scientific discovery' (Sober and Wilson, 1998). Given the long history of attempts to 
draw lessons for society from the nature of the evolutionary process, this conclusion is of 
obvious value. 
 
The other way in which the Biohumanities can contribute to critical science 
communication is through creating and criticizing broad 'visions' of biology in the sense 
described in Section 3. Take, for example, the insistence of ethologists such as Patrick 
Bateson (Bateson, 1976) and Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 1986) that biological 
development is more like the execution of a recipe than the execution of a blueprint. 
Communication theorists have criticized this proposal on the grounds that many 
audiences do not understand these metaphors in the way their creators intend (Condit, 
1999a; Condit, 1999b). But this assumes that Bateson and Dawkins' aim was to find a 
good metaphor to communicate the (known) content of science. Instead, at the level of 
this broad summary of what we have learnt from a century of genetics, the content of 
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science is contested. The two metaphors embody different, competing 'visions' of that 
content. The recipe metaphor is an attempt to communicate the vision that morphogenesis 
is less like the workings of a computer than like a chemical reaction. Developmental 
biologist H. Frederick Nijhout writes, "The simplest and also the only strictly correct 
view of the function of genes is that they supply cells, and ultimately organisms, with 
chemical materials" (Nijhout, 1990, 444). While Nijhout does not use the r-word, it is on 
the tip of his tongue: protein-coding sequences in the genome are a list of ingredients. So 
at the deepest level, the recipe metaphor was intended, not as a device for popularization, 
but as a vision of developmental biology and one intended to be taken as seriously as 
17th century life-scientists like Stephen Hales took the idea that the body is a machine. 
Critics of the blueprint metaphor write of the need for a 'gestalt-switch' - a change in 
scientific vision - so that without necessarily questioning any specific findings of past 
research, biologists will come to see those findings differently and perhaps prioritize 
different questions for future research. In the same way, those who defend metaphors like 
that of the genetic program are usually convinced that the analogy between the genome 
and some aspect of computer technology is very close indeed. For example, someone 
who believes that small RNAs are the real key to the control of development will 
emphasize the 'digital', combinatorial nature of the specificity of these sequences for the 
regions of DNA which they bind (Mattick, 2004). For such authors, a computational 
vision of the genome embodies in a diffuse way a set of expectations, research 
emphasizes, tactical decisions about what to build into artificial experimental systems, 
and so forth.  
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Authors in the biohumanities are in an excellent position to contribute to discussions of 
this kind.  The broad interpretations of biology which they offer are founded in the best 
cases on an extensive knowledge of the biology itself and an extensive historical 
knowledge of how current intellectual formations came into being, and of the 'roads not 
taken'. This puts them in a position to break out of conventional representations of 
biology and create entirely new visions. For example, one of the most striking new 
metaphors of recent years has been philosopher and former cell-biologist Lenny Moss's 
description of the regulation of gene expression as the work of 'ad hoc committees' of 
molecules assembled not on the basis of some plan to be found in the fertilized egg, but 
on the basis of the particular molecular 'expertise' available in a cell as a result of its 
particular history of transactions with other cells/tissues and with influences derived from 
the wider environment (Moss, 2003). This is not merely a new metaphor; it is a 
metaphorical expression of the sort of 'postgenomic biology' that we sketched in Section 
three.  Moss's new figurative landscape has been taken up by a major contributor to the 
literature on the public understanding of genetics (Turney, 2005).  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper describes a way to think about the role of history, philosophy and social 
studies of biology in relation to biology itself, namely as 'biohumanities'. Biohumanities 
research has four related aims: deepening our understanding of biology itself, 
constructive science criticism, creating alternative visions of biology, and critical science 
communication. In Section two we outlined how the new 'experimental philosophy' 
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methods can contribute to the first of these aims. Section three and four demonstrated the 
potential of biohumanities research to further the other three aims.  
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